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ARGUMENT 
THE DEFENDANT WAS CONVICTED OF THE CRIME CHARGED 
FOR BEING A PERSON OF CRIMINAL CHARACTER. 
Testimony of the May 18 incident of domestic violence, 
of speculative assertions that the defendant attempted to 
burglarize the family home, that he engaged in domestic 
violence and assaultive behavior for which there was 
insufficient evidence for prosecution, and that he 
"kidnaped" his wife on a previous occasions, proved not that 
the defendant kidnaped his wife in the instant case, but 
that the defendant was a person of criminal character and he 
must have kidnaped his wife. 
The State claims that the testimony of the May 18 
assault was relevant to refute allegations that Ms. Palmer 
had fabricated the story, that Ms. Palmer was "so afraid 
that she and her children stayed with her parents7' only 
"visiting the family home at certain" times. Br. Aple. at 
21. The fact that Ms. Palmer chose different times to be 
at the home supports Mr. Holbert's claim that his wife 
invited him to the home because Mr. Holbert had no way to 
know, absent information from Ms. Palmer, when the family 
would be there. That possibility was naturally lost on the 
Page 1 of 9 
jury given all the inadmissible evidence it heard, including 
evidence of an attempted break-in at the family home for 
which the defendant was presumed to be the perpetrator 
despite a lack of evidence connecting him with the alleged 
attempted break-in; allegations of domestic violence and 
protective order violations not prosecuted for lack of 
evidence; references that the defendant had held the 
defendant "hostage" before; and testimony that the defendant 
had a prior conviction for assault. 
The jury's only picture of the defendant was what 
appeared to be his hostility and controlling behavior, an 
illusion painted by the prosecutor through his use of claims 
of prior bad acts which were not prosecuted for lack of 
evidence, the victims characterization of a prior 
"kidnaping" incident, and evidence of the defendant's prior 
misdemeanor assault conviction. The admission of that 
evidence set the stage for the jury to do just what Dean 
Wigmore described in his treatise on the admissibility of 
specific bad acts testimony, to give "excessive weight to 
the vicious record of crime" and allowed it to bear "too 
strongly on the present charge...irrespective of the 
accused's guilt of the present charge." See, State vs. 
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Doporto, 935 P.2d, 484, 488 (Utah 1997) (citation omitted). 
The fact remains that evidence of May 18 incident, in 
addition to the evidence of the prior break-in attempt at 
the family home, allegations of two prior domestic violence 
and protective order violations not prosecuted for lack of 
evidence, and the introduction of the defendant's prior 
misdemeanor conviction, was unfairly prejudicial, 
inflammatory, and it distorted the deliberative process. The 
process was distorted because the jury had no choice but to 
convict for kidnaping this man because it had before it 
speculative assertions that he had attempted to burglarize 
the family home, and although no charges were filed, 
assertions that he had kidnaped his ex-wife before and had 
engaged in numerous acts of domestic violence and assaultive 
behavior before, finally, that he was convicted for 
assaulting Ms. Palmer before. Mr. Holbert was convicted of 
kidnaping as a result of his presumed bad character and his 
prior bad acts. 
If the improper evidence had not been considered by the 
jury, there is a reasonable likelihood that it would have 
returned a different verdict, therefore, the admission of 
the evidence was not harmless. 
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EVIDENCE OF THE MAY ASSAULT DOES NOT 
MEET REQUIREMENTS FOR ADMISSIBILITY 
UNDER RULE 403. 
The State claims testimony that the defendant had 
previously assaulted his wife was relevant to establish his 
motive and intent, and to show a specific pattern of 
behavior toward her. In deciding whether evidence of other 
crimes is admissible, the trial court must determine (1) 
whether the evidence is being offered for a proper, 
noncharacter purpose under 404(b), (2) whether such evidence 
meets the requirement of rule 402, and (3) whether the 
evidence meets the requirements of rule 403. State v. 
Decorso, 1999 UT 59, 993 P.2d 837, cert denied 528 U.S. 1164 
(2000) . 
Assume for the sake of discussion that the challenged 
evidence was offered for a proper, noncharacter purpose, 
and, as the State contends, it is admissible to prove motive 
to commit the offense charged. Its admissibility must still 
fail because it does not meet the third part of the analysis 
for admissibility. Under Rule 403, other crimes evidence 
does not meet rule 403's requirements if its probative value 
is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair 
prejudice, confusion of the issues or misleading the jury. 
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Decorso, 1999 UT 57 525. 
In deciding whether the danger of unfair prejudice 
substantially outweighs the probative value of evidence, the 
court must consider 
the strength of the evidence as to the commission of the 
other crime, the similarities between the crimes, the 
interval of time that has elapsed between the crimes, 
the need for the evidence, the efficacy of the 
alternative proof, and the degree to which the evidence 
probably will rouse the jury to overmastering hostility. 
Id. at 529. 
Ms. Palmer testified that Mr. Holbert held her "hostage" 
for "an hour and a half", however, Mr. Holbert was never 
charged with kidnaping in that incident. The court also 
permitted testimony of two prior investigations into 
allegations of protective order violations and domestic 
violence which did not produce sufficient evidence to pursue 
prosecution. Likewise, testimony was admitted that law 
enforcement investigated an attempted burglary at the 
couple's residence and that they considered the defendant to 
be a suspect in that incident. Neither the prior allegations 
of protective order violations and domestic violence, and the 
attempted burglary at the marital home produced sufficient 
evidence to warrant prosecution. If several investigations by 
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law enforcement cannot produce sufficient evidence to pursue 
prosecution, the evidence as to the commission of the crimes 
must be considered weak and as a result, should not be 
permitted at trial. 
Finally, the challenged evidence obviously has a high 
degree of probability for rousing the jury to overmastering 
hostility. The jury heard evidence that the defendant 
assaulted Ms. Palmer on numerous occasions, that he held her 
"hostage", and that he did so in the presence of his 
children. Those acts do rouse overmastering hostility. 
Domestic violence is so reviled in our society that violation 
of a protective order can be a felony offense. 
The danger of unfair prejudice substantially outweighs 
the probative value of evidence because the evidence of the 
commission of the other crimes was so weak that they could 
not be prosecuted, there was no need for the evidence, and 
the evidence likely roused the jury to overmastering 
hostility. Therefore, the evidence was not admissible under 
rule 403 and does not meet the admissibility test under 
404(b). 
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ONE PRIOR CONVICTION FOR SIMPLE ASSAULT 
DOES NOT CONSTITUTE A "PATTERN OF ABUSE" 
The State contends prior bad acts are admissible to show 
a "pattern of abuse" between the defendant and his wife. 
However, as argued above, the evidence of prior protective 
order violations and domestic violence, and an attempted 
burglary at the couple's home, was insufficient to warrant 
prosecution. It goes without saying, therefore, that it is 
insufficient to constitute proof that a "pattern of abuse" 
exited between the defendant and his wife. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth herein and in the Appellant's 
Brief, the Defendant seeks reversal of his conviction for 
Aggravated Kidnaping and asks the court to remand for a new 
trial because he was deprived of his constitutionally 
protected right of a fair trial and his right to effective 
assistance of counsel. 
DATED this 1^? day of V^TlAg) , 2002 
WEBER PUBLIC DEFENDER'S 
ASSOCIATION 
Sharon S. Sipes 
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I hereby certify that on the 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
day of 5— 
2002 I mailed postage prepaid first-class mail, two copies 
of the Appellant's Reply Brief to Jeanne B. Inouye, Assistant 
Attorney General, 160 East 300 South, 6th Floor, PO Box 
140854, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84114-0854. 
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NO ADDENDUM IS NECESSARY 
Page 9 of 9 
